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UNWRAPPING RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION CLAIMS:
THE IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE AFTER
EEOC V. ABERCROMBIE
Valerie Weiss*
You never get a second chance to make a first impression.

I. INTRODUCTION
“Let’s say four people show up for a job interview . . . . So the first
is a Sikh man wearing a turban, the second is a Hasidic man wearing a
hat, the third is a Muslim woman wearing a hijab, [and] the fourth is a
Catholic nun in a habit,”1 Justice Alito proposed during oral argument
in EEOC v. Abecrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.2 Although this may seem like
the start of a casual dinner table joke, this hypothetical, in part, mirrors
a real scenario that quickly escalated into a religious discrimination
lawsuit.
In 2008, Samantha Elauf, a 17-year-old community college
student, interviewed for a “model” (i.e., salesperson) position at
Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., but Abercrombie turned her down.3
Although Elauf initially scored high marks on the interview checklist,
meeting the expectations for hire,4 the hiring manager later lowered
Elauf’s score, as per the request of a higher-ranking employee, so that
she was no longer eligible for the position.5 Abercrombie denied Elauf
the retail job because the hijab6 that Elauf wore to the interview
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Rutgers University, 2012. Special thanks to my faculty advisor, Dean Charles Sullivan,
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1
Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
2
135 S. Ct. at 2028.
3
See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1112–14 (10th
Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 1111 n.1 (citing JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 310 (4th ed.
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conflicted with Abercrombie’s “Look Policy.”7
Abercrombie
staffcorrectlyassumed that Elauf was Muslim and further assumed
that her practice of wearing a hijab would have required an exemption
from the company’s Look Policy.8 Notably, neither the hiring manager
nor Elauf discussed the clothing conflict at the interview.
Elauf filed a religious discrimination suit against Abercrombie,
alleging that the company failed to provide her a reasonable religious
accommodation, in contravention of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.9 In response, Abercrombie argued that it was not required to
accommodate Elauf’s religious beliefs—even though it knew about
them—because Elauf failed to inform the store that she would need an
exemption from the Look Policy.10
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees from
two forms of discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate
impact.11 The disparate treatment provision of Title VII prohibits
employers from: (1) failing to hire an applicant (2) because of (3)
“such individual’s . . . religion” (which includes her religious
practice).12 The disparate impact theory prohibits employers “from
using a facially neutral employment practice that has an unjustified
impact on members of a protected class.”13 Title VII also incorporates
a mandate of accommodation of employees’ religious practices.14
2011)) (defining a “hijab” as the “veil or head covering worn by Muslim women in
public”). Some Islam scholars interpret the Quran to require women to wear a hijab,
or headscarf, in order to show their modesty. MANAL HAMZEH, PEDAGOGIES OF
DEVEILING: MUSLIM GIRLS AND THE HIJAB DISCOURSE 79 (Curry Stephenson Malott ed.,
2012). There is no single type of hijab that must be worn by a devout Muslim woman;
there are many different styles and colors of hijabs or headscarves that are consistent
with Islam.
PAUL GWYNNE, WORLD RELIGIONS IN PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE
INTRODUCTION 235 (2008). For the purposes of this Comment, the terms “hijab” and
“headscarf” are used interchangeably.
7
Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1114. The Abercrombie brand exemplifies a classic East
Coast collegiate style of clothing. The company’s “Look Policy” requires all of its
employees to dress in clothing that is consistent with the kinds of clothing it sells in its
stores, and as a part of its policy, the company “prohibits employees from wearing
caps;” notably, the policy does not explain the meaning of the term “cap.” Id. at 1111.
8
Id. at 1114.
9
Id. at 1112.
10
Id. at 1114.
11
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (2014).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Before the Abercrombie decision, the lower courts and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in its employment guidelines have understood
failure-to-accommodate religious practices as a separate, third category under Title
VII; however, as all nine justices of the Abercrombie Court make clear, failure-to-
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Traditionally, to bring a religious accommodation claim, the applicant
must show that: (1) she had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted
with an employment requirement; (2) she informed her employer of this
belief; and (3) she was not accommodated, resulting in sufficiently
adverse employment action.15
Applying Title VII’s reasonable accommodation mandate, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
granted summary judgment in favor of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), reasoning that Abercrombie had
enough notice to make it aware that there was a conflict between
Elauf’s religious belief or practice and the Look Policy requirement of
the job.16 Specifically, the court determined the EEOC met its burden
by showing that Elauf wore the headscarf to the interview, the
interviewing manager assumed that Elauf was a Muslim and wore the
headscarf for religious reasons, and the interviewing manager
conferred with the district manager because she thought that Elauf
would require an accommodation of the store’s Look Policy.17
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed the district court and instead ordered summary
judgment in favor of Abercrombie.18
Abercrombie’s winning
argument stated that an applicant needed to provide explicit, direct
notice to the employer of her religious practices.19 Therefore, Elauf
failed to satisfy the notice provision of accommodation because she did
not explicitly inform the interviewing manager that she wore a hijab
for religious reasons and would need an accommodation due to a
conflict between her religious practice and the store’s policy.20 Because
Elauf failed to make any such statement or request, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that Abercrombie could not have violated Title VII.21
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit rejected the EEOC’s position that
accommodate is merely a way to characterize disparate treatment or disparate impact
claims. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2041 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For purposes of this
Comment, it is helpful to still provide the failure-to-accommodate claims as previously
understood by the lower courts.
15
Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1122 (citing Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers,
225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000)); see also Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244
F.3d 495, 499 n.9 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
16
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1286 (N.D.
Okla. 2011).
17
Id. at 1286.
18
Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1110–11.
19
Id. at 1122–23.
20
Id. at 1122.
21
Id.
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either the employee informing the employer of the conflict or the
employer otherwise becoming aware of the conflict established a prima
facie case.22
Although Abercrombie has since changed its Look Policy
accommodations to avoid future claims like those of Ms. Elauf,23 the
United States Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal by the EEOC
to answer the question at the heart of this case:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits a
prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant in
order to avoid accommodating a religious practice that it
could accommodate without undue hardship . . . . [Does
this] prohibition appl[y] only where an applicant has
informed the employer of his need for an
accommodation[?]24
In other words, must a job applicant provide an employer with direct,
explicit notice that she requires a religious accommodation to gain the
protections of Title VII, or is some lesser knowledge or notice sufficient
to trigger an employer’s duty to engage in a dialogue with the applicant
or employee about the possible need for a religious accommodation?25
For instance, if Abercrombie made an informed guess that Elauf wore
a hijab for religious purposes, does that constitute “knowing?”
On June 1, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its 8-1 opinion,
holding that “actual knowledge” of the need for an accommodation is
not required, and the applicant need not specifically request an
accommodation. Delivering the majority opinion, Justice Scalia
stressed that even if an employer has no more than an
“unsubstantiated suspicion” of an applicant’s religious beliefs or
practices, the employer violates Title VII where its action is motivated by
a desire to avoid a potential accommodation.26 Therefore, an
“employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed
22

Id. at 1123.
In 2013, Abercrombie issued an apology to the community after settling two
other EEOC suits regarding discrimination against Muslim workers whose hijabs
conflicted with the company’s “Look Policy.” Kim Bhasin, Abercrombie Modifies
Controversial Look Policy As Part of Settlement with Fired Muslim Workers, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/23/abercrombiemodifies-look-policy_n_3976237.html.
The company stated: “As part of our
commitment to fair hiring practices and fostering a diverse workplace, we continually
evaluate our existing policies. With respect to hijabs, in particular, we determined
three years ago to institute policy changes that would allow such headwear.” Id.
24
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015).
25
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 65–66 (1986).
26
Id.
23
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or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions.”27
While Abercrombie’s central holding is a deserving win for job
applicants, the decision still fails to answer the question: what qualifies
as an “unsubstantiated suspicion” or a “hunch” in a motive inquiry? By
doing away with “knowledge” and “notice,” the majority’s “suspicion”
standard puts an employer in uncertain situations, and it is easy to
imagine scenarios where an employer may risk suit for both asking and
not asking certain questions. For instance, if an employer proactively
describes all the workplace polices (e.g., dress attire) and asks if
complying with these policies would pose a problem for the applicant,
such questions may be characterized as intended to weed out specific
groups, and therefore, considered suspect. Furthermore, if the
applicant states that she, in fact, cannot comply with the policies, the
employer may be tempted to ask explicitly whether her reason is based
on a religious belief. Such an action complicates common and
accepted practice where employers avoid asking applicants questions
about their religious beliefs. Or if the applicant states she cannot
comply with the policy but the employer does not suspect she needs an
accommodation, will the employer face liability for not inquiring
further? The last scenario highlights Justice Alito’s point in his
concurrence: the Court cannot just do away with the knowledge and
notice standards because an inquiry into motive still raises questions of
what the employer, in reality, “knew” at the time of the interview.28
The Abercrombie case depicts how navigating a work-religion issue
is more challenging than ever—for both the employee and the
employer.29 Claims of workplace religious discrimination are on the
rise. Since 2000, religious discrimination claims filed with the EEOC
have almost doubled, with 3502 claims filed in 2015.30 In light of
today’s globalized world, technology advances, and emphasis on
political correctness, it can be difficult for employers to balance their
interests against employees’ interests. Employers are ultimately
interested in running their business operations as they see fit, but are
limited by the protections Title VII affords to employees.31 Central to
27

Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2033.
Id. at 2035–36 (Alito, J., concurring in part).
29
See also Press Release, EEOC, Abercrombie & Fitch Settles Two Pending EEOC
Religious Discrimination Suits (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
newsroom/release/9-23-13c.cfm.
30
Religion-Based Charges FY 1997– FY 2015, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/religion.cfm (last visited
Apr. 6, 2016).
31
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2014). With the passage of Title VII, Congress
extended the protection of religious freedom to the workplace.
28
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the determination of the notice standard dispute was the tension
between an employer’s right to run business operations and an
employee’s right to religious freedom.
This Comment argues that the United States Supreme Court’s
decision about a college student and her part-time job has far-reaching
implications for the American workplace; specifically, the new law fails
to provide any guidelines for employer “best practices” during the
interactive hiring process. Part II of this Comment provides a brief
overview of religious discrimination claims under Title VII and the
framework for analyzing such claims. Part III reviews the previous
circuit split on religious reasonable accommodation claims as a
starting point to discuss the EEOC and Abercrombie’s positions in
front of the high court. Part IV examines the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Abercrombie, with a specific focus on the “suspicion” standard Justice
Scalia employed in the majority opinion and the more practical aspect
of Justice Alito’s concurrence. Part V considers the aftermath of the
Abercrombie decision, particularly how the clarified religious
accommodation claims analysis affects future claims, as well as pending
litigation in the lower courts. Part VI discusses the impact on employer
“best practices” after the Supreme Court failed to account for the
practical aspects of interviewing, the balancing of employer and
employee interests, and society’s interest in eliminating unfair
employment discrimination to allow for the most just outcome. Part
VII concludes.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN
DISPARATE TREATMENT AND RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION CLAIMS
BEFORE ABERCROMBIE
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress
declared the elimination of discrimination a national goal of the
highest priority.32 Unlawful discrimination in the employment context
falls under Title VII, which states that it is “an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion,” subject to
certain limitations.33 In 1972, Congress added to Title VII an express
obligation of employers to reasonably accommodate an employee

32
33

See S. REP. No. 872, pt. 1, at 11, 24 (1964).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2014).
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when that employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs, practices, or
observance conflict with a work requirement, absent undue hardship
to the employer.34 Until the recent Abercrombie decision, employers and
employees alike have understood failure to accommodate claims as a
third avenue of liability under Title VII, in addition to disparate
treatment and disparate impact. Before addressing the recent
clarification of Title VII claims, this section will provide an overview of
disparate treatment and religious accommodation claims in past
jurisprudence.
A. Per Se Discrimination
Disparate treatment claims arise where an employer takes an
“adverse employment action”35 due to the employee’s religion.36 An
employee can prove a disparate treatment claim through direct
evidence of discriminatory intent, such as, “I would never hire her
because she is Jewish,” or indirectly through presumptions and shifts
in the burden of proof. In cases where the intentional discrimination
must be proven through indirect evidence, the Supreme Court has
established a burden-shifting framework.37
To establish a prima facie case, the employee must show that: (1)
she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the
position she held; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and
(4) the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to
the inference of discrimination.38 The establishment of a prima facie
34

§ 2000e(j); TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 66 (1977).
For purposes of a Title VII discrimination claim, an “adverse employment
action” is a tangible change in work conditions that produces a material employment
disadvantage. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2014); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. For
instance, a materially adverse action might include: discharge; demotion or transfer
accompanied by decreased wages or salary, a less distinguished job title, a material loss
of benefits, and/or a loss of seniority; a supervisor’s decision not to take action to stop
harassment by co-workers in retaliation for employee’s opposition to civil rights
violations; or a permanent transfer to another shift where the change in work hours
impacted employee’s ability to continue her education.
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL NO. 915.003 § 8-II(D) (2008)
[hereinafter EEOC Compl. Man.].
36
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973) (refusal to
rehire allegedly based on racial discrimination); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (discussing disparate treatment claims in the context of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967).
37
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
38
Marmulszteyn v. Napolitano, 523 F. App’x 13, 15 (2013) (quoting Ruiz v.
County of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 2009)); Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754
F.2d 1100, 1105–06 (4th Cir. 1985) (reasoning that the inference of discrimination
may include comparator evidence if an employee can show that the employer treated
the employee more harshly than other employees of a different religion, or no
35
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case creates a presumption of discrimination, which will result in
liability unless the employer proffers a “legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason” for the adverse employment decision.39 If the employer is able
to put such a reason into evidence, the plaintiff may still prevail by
demonstrating that the proffered reason was merely a pretext (i.e., a
cover up) for unlawful religious discrimination.40 The burden of
persuasion remains on the employee throughout.41
B. Religious Accommodation Claims
The duty to accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs is
“implicated only when there is a conflict between an employee’s
religious practice and the employer’s neutral policy.”42 To make a
prima facie case of failure to accommodate a religious belief, the
employee traditionally had to show that: (1) she had a bona fide
religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement; (2)
she informed her employer of this belief; and (3) she was fired or not hired
for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.43
Further, the fact that violating the employer’s rule is otherwise a
legitimate reason for discharge is irrelevant: the duty of
accommodation requires the employer to grant an exception to such
a rule if the accommodation is reasonable and does not pose an undue
hardship.44
The plaintiff must also prove that there was an

religion, who had engaged in similar conduct).
39
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1120 (10th Cir.
2013).(quoting EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(1)).
43
Id. at 1122 (citing Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155
(10th Cir. 2000)); see also Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495, 499 n.9
(5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
44
Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1018 (4th Cir. 1996). The
court in Chalmers provides the following example:
[A]n employee who is terminated for refusing to work on Sundays can
maintain an accommodation claim even if other nonreligious employees
were also fired for refusing Sunday work, and even though the
employer’s proffered reason for the discharge—the refusal to perform
required Sunday work—is legitimate and nondiscriminatory (because
the Sunday work rule applies to all employees, regardless of religion). If
the employee has notified the employer of his religious need to take
Sundays off, the burden rests on the employer to show that it could not
accommodate the employee’s religious practice without undue
hardship.
Id.
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accommodation available and that the request was reasonable.45 After
an employee makes such a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer: (1) to rebut one or more elements of the plaintiff’s case;46
(2) to show that it offered a reasonable accommodation of religious
practice;47 or (3) to show that the accommodation would work an
undue hardship upon the employer and its business.48
As noted supra, this Comment focuses primarily on the second
element of the prima facie case of a reasonable accommodation claim:
when does the employer have knowledge or information of the
employee’s belief, such that the employer is aware of a possible conflict
between the employee’s belief and her employment? To better
address this question, it is helpful to break down the religious
accommodation framework into discrete parts. As a practical matter,
there are three main issues to consider when addressing requests for
accommodations: (1) what is a bona fide religious belief; (2) what
constitutes a religious accommodation request that is entitled to Title
VII protection; and (3) what is the extent of the employer’s obligation
to reasonably accommodate religious beliefs or practices?

45

See, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002) (holding that, in
the Americans with Disabilities Act context, the employee must prove the
reasonableness of an accommodation request).
46
Thomas, 225 F.3d at 1156. The Tenth Circuit has also noted that using the
McDonnell Douglas framework in a religious accommodation context presents a
different inquiry. The Thomas court reasoned:
Thus, we use the burden-shifting mechanism, not to probe the subjective
intent of the employer, but rather simply to provide a useful structure by
which the district court . . . can determine whether the various parties
have advanced sufficient evidence to meet their respective traditional
burdens to prove or disprove the reasonableness of the accommodations
offered or not offered.
Id. at 1155 n.6 (quoting Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1178 n.12 (10th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
47
See, e.g., Barnett, 535 U.S. at 391.
48
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). The extent
of hardship to the business that must be shown is minimal, but it must be more than
mere inconvenience or some modest hardship. Id. at 84. The test is whether the
employer would suffer “more than a de minimis cost” by accommodation. Id. Despite
the minimal showing required by an employer to defeat an accommodation claim,
the accommodation requirement does impose some burden on an employer and does
favor the employee’s rights over the employer’s rights, at least to the extent of
prohibiting utterly arbitrary discrimination against any person based solely on the
employee’s religious beliefs and practices. Id.; see also Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics
Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397, 401 (9th Cir. 1978).
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1. Bona Fide Religious Belief
Title VII defines “religion” to include those “aspects of religious
observance and practice” that an employer is able to “reasonably
accommodate without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer’s business.”49 Courts have held that religion includes both
traditional mainstream religions, such as Judaism, Islam, and
Christianity, and non-mainstream religions that may or may not be
traditionally recognized as a formal, organized church.50 Religion also
encompasses atheism,51 as well as beliefs that are “only subscribed to by
a small number of people, or that seem illogical or unreasonable to
others.”52 A religious belief usually embodies distinctive, ultimate ideas
about life, purpose, and death,53 but does not include “[s]ocial,
political, or economic philosophies, [or] personal preferences.”54
Because the expansive definition of “religion” raises opportunities
for a particular employee to falsely use “religion” to avoid job burdens
or obtain job benefits,55 the determination on this issue generally will
depend on the fact finder’s assessment of the employee’s sincerity.56 In
United States v. Seeger, the Court reasoned that “[w]hile the ‘truth’ of a
49

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2014).
Telfair v. Fed. Express Corp., 934 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1383 (S.D. Fla. 2013); EEOC
Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-I(A)(1).
51
Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 448 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“The incorporation of some form of deity . . . into a belief system is not required for
Title VII protection, which recognizes atheism as a religion.”) (citing Reed v. Great
Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2003)).
52
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981); see also
EEOC v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de
P.R., 279 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2002) (reiterating that religious beliefs do not need to
be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others).
53
Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 448; see Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir.
2005) (“[W]hen a person sincerely holds beliefs dealing with issues of ultimate
concern that for her occupy a place parallel to that filled by God in traditionally
religious persons, those beliefs represent her religion.”) (internal quotations and
ellipses omitted); EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-I(A)(1).
54
EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-I(A)(1), Ex. 6. (“Personal Preference
That is Not a Religious Belief”); Telfair, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 (noting that an
employer is not obligated to accommodate an employee’s purely personal
preference); Slater v. King Soopers, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 809, 810 (D. Colo. 1992)
(explaining that the Ku Klux Klan is not a religion, but rather an organization political
and social in nature); cf. Chenzira v. Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 1:11cv-00917, 2012 WL 6721098, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2012) (“The [c]ourt finds it
plausible that [p]laintiff could subscribe to veganism with a sincerity equating that of
traditional religious views.”).
55
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
405 (2d ed. 2012).
56
Union Independiente, 279 F.3d at 56.
50
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belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question
whether it is ‘truly held.’”57 An analysis of plaintiff’s sincerity, however,
“does not require a deep analysis of his conscious and/or subconscious
reasons or motives for holding his beliefs,” mainly because, as the
Court notes, “[t]hese are matters of interpretation where the law must
tread lightly.”58 Therefore, a relevant consideration for the fact finder
is whether the employee’s conduct aligns with her professed belief.59
These ideas and principles about life, purpose, and death “have
significant implications for the enforcement of Title VII’s proscription
against religious discrimination.”60 First, a religious belief is not merely
a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction.61
So if the belief does not truly relate to religious matters (i.e., ultimate
ideas), the person’s conduct associated with that belief is not protected
under Title VII.62 Second, to further complicate the analysis, an
employee may personally possess a religious belief even if such belief
is not reflected in the tenets of that individual’s announced faith.63 Put
differently, an employee’s beliefs can deviate from the tenets of her
formal religion, but still be considered sincere, religious beliefs
covered under Title VII.64 And third, an employee may engage in what
57

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (clarifying the definition of
religion and holding that a belief is religious if it “is sincere and meaningful [and]
occupies a place in the life of the [employee] parallel to that filled by the orthodox
belief in God”).
58
Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 452–54.
59
See Union Independiente, 279 F.3d at 56–57 (denying summary judgment where
evidence existed that the employee’s conduct was contrary to the tenets of his
professed religious belief); see also Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 451–52 (holding the plaintiff
produced enough evidence of his desire to return to Nigeria to perform funeral rights
for his father, such that his desire came from his personal and sincere religious
beliefs).
60
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1119 (10th Cir. 2013).
61
Id.
62
Id.; see Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n
employee is not permitted to redefine a purely personal preference or aversion as a
religious belief.”); cf. United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1483–84 (10th Cir.
1996) (determining, for purposes of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, whether
a belief qualifies as a “religious belief” by assessing, inter alia, whether the belief
“address[es] fundamental questions about life, purpose, and death”).
63
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335–36, 343 (1970) (noting that the
petitioner’s objection to engage in war was religious even though his church did not
teach those beliefs).
64
Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the employee’s belief that she needed to use the phrase “Have a Blessed
Day” was a religious practice covered by Title VII even though using the phrase was
not a requirement of her religion); Rivera v. Choice Courier, Sys., Inc., No. 01 Civ.
2096 (CBM), 2004 WL 1444852, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2004) (finding that the
statutory language providing that Title VII encompasses “all aspects of religious
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appears to be a religious practice, but does so for cultural or other
reasons.65 Such behavior would fall outside the protections of Title VII
and not require an accommodation.66
While an employer need only accommodate sincerely held
beliefs, the EEOC suggests that employers should ordinarily assume
that an employee’s request for a religious accommodation is sincere.67
An employer, however, can request additional information if he has an
objective basis for questioning either the religious nature or the
sincerity of an employee’s belief or practice.68 Although not
dispositive, factors relevant to evaluating the sincerity of an employee’s
beliefs include: (1) whether the employee has behaved in a manner
inconsistent with his or her proclaimed religious belief; (2) whether
the requested accommodation is a highly desirable benefit likely
sought for secular reasons; (3) whether the timing of the
accommodation request is suspect; and/or (4) whether the employer
otherwise has reason to believe that the accommodation is not sought
for religious reasons.69
2.

Religious Accommodation Requests Entitled to Title
VII Protection

Although the term could include other requests, religious
accommodation requests fall predominantly into two categories:
dress/grooming policies70 and scheduling.71 For example, religious
observance and practice, as well as belief,” means that Title VII “protects more than . . .
practices specifically mandated by an employee’s religion”) (internal citations
omitted).
65
Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1119.
66
Id.
67
EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-I(A)(2)-(3).
68
Id. §12-I(A)(3).
69
Id. §12-I(A)(2) (citing cases).
70
Employees in these types of cases generally seek to wear an article of clothing
that does not conform to an employer’s uniform or dress policy. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (permitting
Muslim employee to wear her hijab at work as accommodation of her religious belief
would not have resulted in undue hardship to clothing retailer); EEOC v. Alamo RentA-Car LLC, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (D. Ariz. 2006) (holding employer failed to satisfy its
burden to show it initiated good faith efforts to reasonably accommodate an
employee’s religious practice of wearing a head covering during Muslim holiday of
Ramadan); Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria, 134 F. Supp. 2d 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (failing to
establish any element of a prima facie case regarding his employer’s refusal to let
employee work with a beard as a banquet waiter); Sadruddin v. City of Newark, 34 F.
Supp. 2d 923 (D.N.J. 1999) (sufficiently alleging that the City of Newark terminated
employee for refusing to shave his beard).
71
Employees in these types of cases wish to have time off to worship. See,
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observances or practices may include attending religious services,
praying, wearing religious garb or symbols, displaying religious objects,
following certain dietary guidelines, or refraining from certain
activities.72 Yet, whether a particular practice is based on a “religious”
belief will turn “not on the nature of the activity but on the employee’s
motivation.”73 For example, an employee may forego a flu vaccine for
religious reasons, while another employee might refrain from the shot
for health reasons or based on personal preference.74 So, in one case
the practice might be subject to Title VII reasonable accommodation
requirements, while the latter employee’s restrictions would not be.
Whether or not an activity is “religious” becomes a fact-based, case-bycase inquiry focusing on the employee’s motivations for the practice in
question.
3.

Employer Obligations under Title VII

As previously stated, under Title VII an employer has the
obligation to reasonably accommodate an employee’s sincerely held
religious beliefs, practices, or observance, unless the accommodation
would cause an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business.75 Therefore, there is typically an interactive process between
the employer and employee in an effort for the employer to reasonably
e.g., Thomas v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding
that defendant reasonably accommodated employee’s observance that prevented
letter carrier from working Saturdays when it approved his use of leave on Saturdays,
approved use of substitutes when they could be found, and recommended he bid on
position that would not require him to work on Saturdays); EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1569 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding employer’s offer to allow employees to
take a day off from work other than Yom Kippur was not
reasonable accommodation of religious practices of employees who requested that day
off because offered accommodation did not eliminate conflict between employment
requirement and religious practice); EEOC v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 95 F. Supp.
2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2000) (opining employer’s offer to allow employee to swap shifts was
not a reasonable accommodation because he could not work Sundays and could not
personally ask another to work his Sunday shift).
72
EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-I(A)(1).
73
Id. (citing cases). Compare Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679 (9th
Cir. 1998) (holding employer not liable for denying employee’s request to be absent
from work on particular dates to attend religious pilgrimage where evidence showed
that her religious needs could be met by going on the pilgrimage at another time and
that the particular dates she requested were simply a personal preference), with Heller
v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding the employer liable for failing
to accommodate Jewish employee’s attendance of spouse’s conversion ceremony).
74
EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-I(A)(1) (citing LaFevers v. Saffle, 936
F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that “although not all Seventh-day Adventists are
vegetarian, an individual adherent’s genuine religious belief in such a dietary practice
warrants constitutional protection under the First Amendment”)).
75
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2014).
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accommodate the employee’s religious belief. If an accommodation is
available and that accommodation is not an undue hardship for the
employer, the employer is required to provide it. Title VII, however,
does not define the exact parameters of “reasonable accommodation”
or “undue hardship,” which may make it difficult for the employer to
understand the extent of its obligation. Before its decision in
Abercrombie, the Supreme Court has twice interpreted religious
accommodation claims under Title VII, the first case addressing the
scope of a reasonable accommodation and the second case defining
the parameters of undue hardship.76
In Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, the Court held that
employers need offer only reasonable accommodations, whether an
employee’s preferred option or any other, to meet their statutory
obligation.77 A reasonable accommodation is an adjustment to
workplace requirements that eliminates conflict between the
employer’s job requirements and the employee’s religious beliefs or
practices.78 The burden of attempting to accommodate an employee’s
bona fide religious observance or practice rests with the
employer.79 Even so, Title VII does not require an employer to
accommodate the religious practices of an employee exactly the way
the employee requests.80 Once the employer proposes a reasonable
accommodation, its obligation under Title VII is discharged and the
employee cannot insist on a different accommodation.81
Yet,
sometimes the details matter: an employer’s proposed accommodation
will not be considered reasonable if a more favorable accommodation
is given to other employees for nonreligious purposes.82

76

See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
77
Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69.
78
Morissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir.
2007); Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 475 (7th Cir. 2001);
Telfair v. Fed. Express Corp., 934 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1384 (S.D. Fla. 2013); EEOC
Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(3).
79
EEOC v. Townley Eng’g. & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1988).
80
Mathewson v. Fla. Game & Fresh Water Comm., 693 F. Supp. 1044, 1050 (M.D.
Fla. 1988); EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(3).
81
Telfair, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 1384 (reiterating that employer does not have to give
employee a choice among several accommodations and does not have to give
employee his or her preferred accommodation); Mathewson, 693 F. Supp. at 1050.
82
Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 70–71 (“[U]npaid leave is not a reasonable
accommodation when paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious
ones . . . .”).
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In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the Court essentially
reduced the demands on employers by holding that “undue hardship”
must be more than a “de minimis” cost to the employer, which may be
evaluated in terms of loss of profits or efficiency, injury to employee
morale, or other criteria relevant to the individual situation.83 Because
Title VII does not define “undue hardship,” each case turns on its own
facts.84 Facts that influence this analysis include: (1) the cost of the
accommodation regarding the size and operating costs of the
employer; (2) the number of employees who will, in fact, need that
particular accommodation; (3) the type of workplace at issue; and (4)
the nature of the employee’s duties.85 The EEOC’s Compliance
Manual requires that, to establish an undue hardship, the employer
must show how much money or disruption the employee’s
accommodation would involve.86 Furthermore, costs included in a
court’s evaluation encompass more than direct monetary costs; they
also include the burden on the conduct of the employer’s business.
For example, accommodations that reduce employer efficiency,87
impair workplace safety,88 or cause co-workers to carry the
accommodated employee’s share of work89 involve more than a de
minimis cost; in other words, they are unduly burdensome.
83

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 65 (1977).
Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633, 636 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[E]very case boils
down to a determination as to whether the employer acted reasonably.”).
85
EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(B)(1). See also Hardison, 432 U.S. at
84 (holding that ignoring co-workers’ contractual seniority rights would be undue
hardship, and the cost of hiring additional worker or loss of production from not
replacing the unavailable plaintiff were beyond de minimus); Tagore v. United States,
735 F.3d 324, 329–30 (5th Cir. 2013) (ruling that allowing Sikh employee to bring a
ceremonial sword to work was undue hardship because request conflicted with laws
and regulations controlling security in federal buildings); Harrell v. Donahue, 638
F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that accommodation would have violated the
collective bargaining agreement and would have caused more than de minimis
imposition on co-workers).
86
EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(B)(1).
87
Brown v. Polk Cty., 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a de minimis
cost existed where an employer assigned his secretary to type his Bible study notes
because the secretary would otherwise have been performing employer’s work during
that time); EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(B)(2).
88
Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n
employer need not accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs if doing so would
result in discrimination against his co-workers or deprive them of contractual or other
statutory rights.”); EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(B)(1).
89
Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Bhatia v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the cost of
plaintiff’s requests accommodation was more than de minimis when it required coworkers to assume plaintiff’s share of the hazardous work)); EEOC Compl. Man., supra
note 35, § 12-IV(B)(2).
84
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Hardison and Philbrook define the criteria for an employer to make
an assessment of whether a religious accommodation is reasonable and
whether the employer can make the accommodation without undue
hardship. Both cases underscore that the employer and the employee
are expected to engage in an interactive communications process, by
which the employer gathers information to determine whether it can
accommodate the request, and the employee attempts to work with the
employer’s proposed accommodation.90 As a result, the employer is
expected to offer a reasonable accommodation absent an undue
hardship. Inevitably, reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
require a case-by-case inquiry.91
Ordinarily, a duty to accommodate arises once the employer has
adequate notice of the conflict between the employee’s religious
beliefs, work duties, and her need for an accommodation.92 While
other protected classes have more obvious, outward characteristics, a
person’s belief is often not readily apparent; “[a] person’s religion is
not like his sex or race—something obvious at a glance. Even if he
wears a religious symbol, such as a cross or a yarmulka, this may not
pinpoint his particular beliefs and observances.”93 Because an
employee’s religious beliefs may not be readily apparent, an employer
must have notice about the beliefs before it can violate the statute.
According to the EEOC guidelines, no “magic language” is
necessary to constitute notice; the only requirement is that the request
alerts the employer to the presence of a religious motivation.94 That
notice to the employer then triggers a need for the employer to obtain
90

See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(2); see also Adeyeye v.
Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 450 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that
managers can ask employees to clarify the nature of their requests for religious
accommodation).
91
See Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 856 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Because Title
VII does not explicitly define the terms ‘reasonably accommodate’ or ‘undue
hardship,’ ‘the precise reach of the employer’s obligation to its employees is
unclear . . . and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.’” (quoting Beadle v.
Hillsborough Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., 29 F.3d 589, 592 (11th Cir. 1994))).
92
See Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 450; Dixon, 627 F.3d at 856; Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria,
134 F. Supp. 2d 591, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that plaintiff did not provide
sufficient notice when he simply showed up to work with a beard, in violation of
company policy, and claimed the beard was a religious requirement); EEOC Compl.
Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(1).
93
Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 935–36 (7th Cir. 2003).
94
Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 450–51 (holding that employee’s request for leave to travel
to Nigeria and participate in a “funeral ceremony” or “funeral rite” involving animal
sacrifice “so that death will not come or take away any of the children’s life” [sic] was
enough to put employer on notice that request for accommodation was
religious); EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(1).
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more knowledge of the employee’s specific religious beliefs and
accommodations. Usually, this means that an employer will have a
dialogue with the employee and inquire into the employee’s beliefs
and practices.95 Yet, it is possible for an employer to have knowledge
of an employee’s beliefs and practices without direct notice from an
employee. For instance, some circuit courts have held that employers
are on notice of a religious conflict when they have acquired
knowledge about the need for an accommodation through other
sources.96
Then, the question becomes: at what level of knowledge is an
employer sufficiently on notice about a religious practice, and once
that notice is triggered, even if the employer does not have complete
knowledge, does the employer have a duty to inquire further? Before
the Supreme Court weighed in, several circuit courts addressed this
question.97 While certain courts—especially the Tenth Circuit in
Abercrombie—called for complete, particularized, and actual knowledge
of the conflict, others argued that some knowledge of the conflict
constitutes notice and thus triggers the duty to accommodate.98 The
EEOC and Abercrombie used the lower courts’ knowledge standards as
starting points for their positions; however, even more telling of the
complicated and nuanced “knowledge” and “notice” issues is that the
Supreme Court rejected all of the lower courts’ decisions and created
two new viewpoints.99

95

EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(2).
Dixon, 627 F.3d at 855–56 (explaining that employer can become aware of
tension even if employee does not expressly object to a work requirement based on
her religion); Brown v. Polk Cty., 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that
employer only needs to have enough information to understand that there is conflict
between employee’s religious practices and employer’s job requirements); Hellinger
v. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (finding that employer’s
knowledge of employee’s refusal to sell condoms at a prior job due to religious beliefs
was sufficient).
97
See, e.g., Nobach v. Woodland Vill. Nursing Ctr., Inc., 762 F.3d 443 (5th Cir.
2014); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013);
Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2013).
98
See discussion infra Part III.A–C (discussing the circuit split on the notice
standard).
99
See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the Supreme Court’s motive standard).
96
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III. THE KNOWLEDGE STANDARDS AMONG THE CIRCUITS AND THE
EEOC
Bringing a Title VII claim is complex and multifaceted. Because
conflicts between work and religion are common, a need exists for an
approach that would permit a nuanced inquiry into highly factsensitive religious discrimination claims. To understand why the
Supreme Court in Abercrombie created an entirely new shield against
religious bias, one must begin at the lower courts’ decisions and
understand the levels of knowledge that provided sufficient notice,
depending on the jurisdiction.
This section uses the Tenth Circuit’s Abercrombie decision as a
starting point to analyze the three approaches of the circuits, as well as
the EEOC, that have weighed in on this issue. First, this section
highlights the Tenth Circuit’s particularized, actual knowledge
standard. Then, it discusses the courts representing the majority
view—the express notice standard. Finally, it discusses the cases
representing the EEOC’s view—the flexible notice standard.
A. “Particularized and Actual Knowledge” in the Tenth Circuit’s
Abercrombie Decision: The Command and Control View of Religious
Accommodation100
One of the most noteworthy reasonable accommodation cases is
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., in which the Tenth Circuit held
that an applicant or employee must establish that she initially informed
the employer that she engaged in a particular practice for religious
reasons and needed an accommodation for that practice due to a
conflict between her religious practice and the company’s dress
policy.101 The court found that the retailer’s failure to hire the
applicant, Ms. Elauf, was not an act of religious discrimination since
she never informed the company prior to its hiring decision that she
wore a hijab for religious reasons and thus, notice was lacking.102
Unlike the other circuit courts adopting an express notice standard,
however, the Abercrombie court set an even higher bar for express
notice, holding that only the employer’s particularized, actual knowledge
of the key facts would meet the notice requirement that triggers the
100

See Charles Sullivan, Triggering the Duty of Accommodating Religion, WORKPLACE
PROF. BLOG (Oct. 20, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/
2013/10/a-similar-problem-arises-with-respect-tothe-duty-to-accommodate-tworecent-contrasting-opinions-from-the-samecircuit-indicat.html.
101
Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1131–33.
102
Id. at 1110–11.
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employer’s duty to accommodate the applicant.103 Put another way, an
employer can be liable under Title VII for failing to accommodate an
employee based on a “religious observance or practice” only if the
employer has actual knowledge that the applicant or employee needs an
accommodation for it (because the practice is an inflexible one), and
the employer’s actual knowledge resulted from direct, explicit notice
from the applicant or employee.104 The Tenth Circuit further
explained that the employer should not be held liable for failure to
have “guessed, surmised, or figured out from the surrounding
circumstances” that the practice was religiously-based and required
accommodation, which means that under the express notice standard,
the employee or applicant must always raise the need for an
accommodation.105 So, in the Abercrombie case, even though the hiring
manager may have thought there was a conflict between the plaintiff’s
religious observance and the store’s rules, she lacked actual knowledge
of the conflict. Most notably, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Elauf’s
situation from the other significant cases in the flexible notice
jurisdictions by reasoning that, even if notice was not sufficient in those
cases, there was some notice.106
Creating an even higher standard, the Tenth Circuit contended
that even “actual knowledge” of the religious nature of
“a particular applicant or employee” is not enough to trigger the duty
to accommodate:
That is because the applicant or employee may not
actually need an accommodation. In other words, an
applicant or employee may not consider his or her religious
practice to be inflexible; that is, he or she may not feel
obliged by religion to adhere to the practice. If that is the
situation, then there actually is no conflict, nor a consequent
need for the employer to provide a reasonable
accommodation.107
In other words, until an employee claims to need an accommodation,
an employer has no obligation to inquire even if the employer was
“generally aware of the beliefs and observances traditionally associated
with a particular religious group, and also knew that the applicant or
employee displayed symbols associated with that group—or even that
the applicant or employee specifically claimed to be a member of that
103

Id.
Id. at 1128.
105
Id. at 1127–28.
106
Id. at 1126 (“[T]here is no doubt that these cases settled for nothing less than
some significant measure of particularized, actual knowledge.”).
107
Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1133–34.
104
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group.”108 Such a scenario could arise when the person does not
consider his or her religious practice to be inflexible and may not feel
obliged by religion to adhere to the practice. Accordingly, there would
not be any conflict triggering the employer’s duty to accommodate.109
Thus, even actual knowledge may not trigger notice and the duty to
accommodate.
The court’s strict approach favored the policy goal of limiting
liability for the employer. By adopting the express notice standard and
specifying a minimum requirement of particularized, actual
knowledge, the court placed the full burden on the employee, which
prevents the employer from having to guess or surmise from the
circumstances that a particular practice is based on religion and that
the plaintiff requires an accommodation for it.110 It also encourages
employers to refrain from inquiring into the religious affiliation of a
prospective or current employee.
Actual knowledge is an extreme standard, especially in cases
arising out of an interview setting and in those with an undisclosed
workplace policy. In those situations, the applicant or employee will
not learn about the work requirement and possible conflict unless the
employer tells them, or, as in the Abercrombie case, could be misled to
believe that there was no conflict at all. If the employer is the only
party in a position to know whether a conflict exists, it would be
blatantly unfair to place the burden on the applicant to detect and
express the conflict.
B. Express Notice Standard
A variation on the express notice problem occurs when an
employee informs a coworker, but not a direct supervisor of her
beliefs.111 In Nobach v. Woodland Village Nursing Center, the nursing
center fired an employee after she refused to pray the rosary with a
patient because it conflicted with her religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s
Witness.112 The court held there was no evidence that the employee
ever advised anyone involved in her discharge that praying the rosary
was against her religion.113 The employee acknowledged that the only
time she made any mention of her religious beliefs was to a certified
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id. at 1132.
Id. at 1133–34.
Id. at 1127.
See Nobach v. Woodland Vill. Nursing Ctr., Inc., 762 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 444, 445.
Id. at 444.
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nurse’s assistant (CNA), a non-supervisory employee, but the employee
never claimed that the CNA told anyone of her reason for refusing to
aid the resident.114 The court further stated that the first time the
employee actually informed her supervisor that she refused to perform
her job duty due to her religious beliefs was following her discharge
for insubordination. Therefore, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit’s holding expands on the Tenth Circuit’s holding,
maintaining that employees must convey their requests directly to their
supervisors or the management, not coworkers, to satisfy the notice
element.
Both the United States Court of Appeals for the Third and Fourth
Circuits addressed situations where an employer had some knowledge
of the employee’s beliefs, but decided that that knowledge was not
sufficient to “put it on notice.” In Wilkerson v. New Media Technology
Charter School, Inc., the Third Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s religious
accommodation claim because she failed to inform her employer of
her need for an accommodation due to a conflict between her
Christian beliefs and the employer’s “libations” or alcohol-drinking
ceremony.115 The court reasoned that the fact that the employer “knew
she was a Christian does not sufficiently satisfy [the plaintiff’s] duty to
provide ‘fair warning’ to [the employer] that she possessed a religious
belief that specifically prevented her from participating in the libations
ceremony.”116 Even if an employer “suspected” that the libations
ceremony would be offensive to the plaintiff, the plaintiff would still
have an obligation to “inform the defendants that the libation
ceremony would offend her religious beliefs.”117
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found that the employer’s
knowledge of the plaintiff’s strongly-held religious beliefs was not
enough to “put it on notice” that those beliefs would compel her to
“write, and send, personal, accusatory letters to co-workers at their
homes.”118 Even if an employer were on notice that an applicant or
employee subscribed to a particular religious belief system, that
114

Id.
Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 319 (3d Cir.
2008). The court does not describe the libations ceremony in its opinion, but an
article describes it as “an African-American ritual where liquid (water or alcohol) is
poured in the four directions of the compass, while the names of the deceased are
read aloud.” Id. at 317 n.1; Paul Mollica, Wilkerson v. New Media Technology Charter
School,
OUTTEN
&
GOLDEN
LLP
BLOG
(Apr.
8,
2008),
http://www.employmentlawblog.info/2008/04/wilkerson-v-new-media-technologycharter-school-no-07-1305-3d-cir-apr-9-2008.shtml.
116
Wilkerson, 522 F.3d at 319.
117
Id. at 319–20.
118
Chalmers v. Tulon Co., 101 F.3d 1012, 1020 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996).
115
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information would not be enough to tell the employer what practices
are religious in “the person’s own scheme of things.”119 This is because
religion is a uniquely personal matter. Ordinarily, the only way the
employer would know such information is if the applicant or employee
informed the employer.
C. Some Knowledge from Some Other Source: The Flexible Notice
Approach Requiring a Case-by-Case Analysis
Other circuits, along with the EEOC and Judge Ebe’s dissent in
Abercrombie, asserted that notice can derive from knowledge by the
applicant or some other source, and that it need not be an affirmative
statement. According to the EEOC guidelines, no “magic language” is
necessary to constitute notice; the only requirement is that the request
alerts the employer to the fact that it is motivated by a religious belief.120
That notice to the employer then triggers a need for the employer to
obtain more knowledge of the employee’s specific religious beliefs and
accommodation.121 Usually, this means that an employer will have a
dialogue with the employee and inquire into the employee’s beliefs
and practices. Thus, the EEOC urged a less restrictive approach,
emphasizing that notice need not be strictly in the form of an
employee or applicant verbally requesting an accommodation. More
specifically, the EEOC reasoned: “The employer’s obligation is to
attempt reasonable accommodation (where no undue hardship would
result) when it has notice—be it from an affirmative statement by the
individual, or some other source—of an individual’s religious belief that
conflicts with a work requirement.”122 So, in the Tenth Circuit
Abercrombie case, although Abercrombie is required to receive notice
119

EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-I(A)(1) (emphasis added); see also
LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117, 1119 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a Seventh Day
Adventist prisoner’s religious belief that he must adhere to a vegetarian diet, if
sincerely held, was entitled to protection under the First Amendment even though the
district court found that not all Seventh Day Adventists are vegetarian and that the
“faith does not require” such a diet).
120
Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 450–51 (7th Cir. 2013)
(holding that employee’s request for leave to travel to Nigeria and participate in a
“funeral ceremony” or “funeral rite” involving animal sacrifice “so that death will not
come or take away any of the children’s life” [sic] was enough to put create a genuine
issue of material fact whether the employer was on notice that the request for
accommodation was religious); EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 35, § 12-IV(A)(1).
121
Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 450–51.
122
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1123 (10th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Response Brief of Appellee U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission at 41, E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th
Cir. 2013) (No. 11-5110)).
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that Elauf needed an accommodation, the knowledge could come
from Elauf’s religious clothing attire instead of a verbal statement.
In the same vein, Judge Ebel in his Tenth Circuit dissent
advocated for the flexible notice standard, reasoning that under
certain circumstances, it makes “no sense” to require the plaintiff to
show first that she informed the company that her religious practice
conflicts with the company policy.123 Judge Ebel relied on the principle
adopted by other circuits—including the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Brown—and also adopted by the
EEOC and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in making his
decision.124 Specifically, Judge Ebel objected to the majority’s
requirement that a “job applicant must initiate a general discussion of
her religious beliefs during the job interview just in case her religious
beliefs and practices might conflict with some unstated policy or work
rule of the employer.”125 The judge suggested that in situations where
there is an undisclosed workplace policy, it should not be the employee’s
burden to initiate the discussion, but rather the employer’s duty to
initiate a dialogue.126 Practically, the employer should inform the
applicant of the work policy and then inquire into whether the
applicant could comply with that policy or whether the company
“could accommodate her belief in some reasonable way.”127 Under the
dissent’s approach, this inquiry would have been sufficient to initiate
any dialogue between the job applicant, Ms. Elauf, and the employer,
Abercrombie, as to whether Ms. Elauf had religious beliefs that
conflicted with Abercrombie’s dress code.
Judge Ebel then combined two evidentiary elements to show how
the EEOC established its prima facie case. Those two elements—that
Elauf was not aware of Abercrombie’s conflicting policy and that
Abercrombie had knowledge that Elauf might hold religious beliefs
that conflicted with its Look Policy—”smack of exactly the religious
discrimination that Title VII prohibits.”128 Abercrombie, Judge Ebel
argued, was able to avoid any dialogue regarding a reasonable
accommodation by failing to disclose the possible conflict and then
refusing to hire Elauf.129 Therefore, according to Judge Ebel, the

123
124
125
126
127
128

Id. at 1143–44 (Ebel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1147–50.
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1150–51.
Id. at 1151.
Abercrombie, 731 F.3d at 1150 (Ebel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
129

Id.
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EEOC established a prima facie case of a failure-to-accommodate
claim.130
Providing an entirely different framework for the Abercrombie case,
Judge Ebel described how the circumstances in the case “justif[ied]
applying . . . a common sense exception to the usual rule,” and
advocated for a known or should have known standard.131 Judge Ebel
referenced a Ninth Circuit decision involving the ADA and
recognizing an exception to the general rule that an employee request
an accommodation where the employer knows, or has reason to know,
that a disability prevents an employee from requesting an
accommodation.132 Judge Ebel stated: “There are, then, exceptions to
the general rule that an employer’s obligation to consider a reasonable
accommodation is not triggered unless and until an employee or job
applicant informs the employer of the need for an accommodation.”133
This standard—the known or should have known standard—as
proposed by Judge Ebel is a more forgiving and flexible approach to
those employees or applicants who are in no position to have
knowledge of a conflict. The standard also ensures that those persons
receive the Title VII protection in a wide range of situations—
including knowledge from some source other than the applicant or
employee and the employer’s own observations. Essentially, if the
employer should have known of the conflict, then the employer is on
notice.
Similarly, the Seventh, Ninth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have
explicitly rejected the express notice standard and have found notice
established by actions that signaled an employer’s awareness of a
religious conflict.134 The courts all adopted the same standard,
reasoning that “[a]n employer need have only enough information
about an employee’s religious needs to permit the employer to
understand the existence of a conflict between the employee’s
religious practices and the employer’s job requirements.”135 For
example, in Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined whether an
130

Id.
Id. at 1148.
132
Id. (citing Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001)).
133
Id.
134
See Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 855–56 (11th Cir. 2010); Brown v.
Polk Cty., 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1995); Heller v. Ebb Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1439
(9th Cir. 1993).
135
Dixon, 627 F.3d at 855–56 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations
omitted); see also Brown, 61 F.3d at 654; Heller, 8 F.3d at 1439.
131
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employee sufficiently notified his employer of the religious character
of his request to attend his father’s funeral in Africa.136 The employee’s
two written requests contained language referring to a “funeral
ceremony,” a “funeral rite,” and “animal sacrifice” and described his
participation as “compulsory,” with the spiritual consequence of his
absence being his own and family members’ deaths.137 Because the
plaintiff’s written requests provided notice, the court’s analysis
centered on whether such notice was sufficient for the employer to
know that the request was based on a religious belief. Although the
plaintiff’s religious beliefs and practices were not “as familiar as
[others] closer to the modern American mainstream,” the court held
that the plaintiff’s request for leave to attend his father’s funeral gave
rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether such a request
provided sufficient notice of its religious nature.138 The Adeyeye court
emphasized that “Title VII has not been interpreted to require
adherence to a rigid script to satisfy the notice requirement,” and in
fact, the court should “construe [Title VII] liberally in favor of
employee protection.” 139 In particular, the court underscored that “an
‘employer cannot shield itself from liability . . . by intentionally
remaining in the dark’” regarding a person’s need for reasonable
accommodation.140 Therefore, while the employee should give fair
notice of the need for an accommodation, the employer is free to seek
clarification regarding an ambiguous request.141
In Heller, a Jewish employee was fired for missing work to attend
his wife’s conversion ceremony.142 While the employee had asked to
attend the ceremony, the employer argued that “because Heller never
explained the nature of the ceremony to [the employer], he did not
give notice of his conflict.”143 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, explaining
that plaintiff’s supervisor “knew” that he was Jewish, “knew” that his
“wife was studying for conversion,” and “when [the plaintiff] requested
the time off, he informed the [supervisor] why he needed to miss

136

See Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 451–52 (7th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 450–51 (emphasis added).
138
Id. at 447, 451.
139
Id. at 450.
140
Id. (quoting Xodus v. Wackenhut Corp., 619 F.3d 683, 686 (7th Cir. 2010)).
141
Id.
142
Heller v. Ebb Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993). The Heller court also
makes the argument that Title VII encompasses all aspects of religious observance and
practice, even those that are not specifically required by the religion. Id. at 1438.
Therefore, although attending the conversion ceremony was not specifically required,
it was still protected conduct under Title VII. Id. at 1438–39.
143
Id. at 1439.
137
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work.”144 Thus, the court held that no specific explanation was
required, reasoning that “[a] sensible approach would require only
enough information about an employee’s religious needs to permit the
employer to understand the existence of a conflict between the
employee’s religious practices and the employer’s job requirements.”145
The Eighth Circuit also rejected the express notice standard.146
In Brown v. Polk County, the employer reprimanded the employee for
engaging in religious activities at work, such as referring to Bible
passages and using office space for group prayers.147 The employer
terminated the employee based, in part, on the reprimand.148 The
court found sufficient notice because the employer’s conduct
demonstrated its awareness of a religious conflict.149 For instance, the
employer issued a reprimand that “related directly to religious
activities by Mr. Brown,” which established that the employer was “well
aware of the potential for conflict between [its] expectations and Mr.
Brown’s religious activities.”150
Like the Eighth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, in Dixon v. Hallmark
Cos., rejected the explicit-notice defense raised by the employer,
concluding that it was not fatal to a couple’s Title VII claims that they
“never expressly told [their supervisor] that they did not want to take
down their artwork because they opposed efforts to remove God from
public places.”151 The court found this notice requirement satisfied by
conduct showing that the employer had in fact received enough
information to be aware of a conflict.152
These courts of appeals do not demand that notice come from
the employee’s explicit verbal statements giving rise to “actual,
particularized knowledge” on the part of the employer. The prima
facie notice requirement in the flexible notice jurisdiction should be
flexibly interpreted when the facts indicate that notice of an
individual’s religious beliefs was provided by some means other than
the individual affirmatively “informing” the employer of the belief. As
noted supra, three courts of appeals have held that an employer needs
to have “only enough information . . . to permit the employer to
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id.
Id.
See Brown v. Polk Cty., 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 652.
Id. at 652–53.
Id. at 654.
Id.
Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 856 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 855–56.
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understand the existence of a conflict,” without regard to the
employer’s actual understanding.153 A fourth court—the Adeyeye
court—has likewise held that an employer can be liable under Title VII
regardless of whether it actually concludes that a conflict exists.
D. Three Notice Scenarios
To better understand the lower courts’ notice standards, it may
be helpful to consider the cases in light of the positions of the
employee and employer with regard to knowledge of the conflict.
These cases can be categorized into three possible situations.
Scenario one: An employee knows there could be a conflict but
the employer does not know there could be a conflict. In this scenario,
since the employee is the one with the actual knowledge of her
religious belief and the conflict at the workplace, the onus falls on the
employee to request an accommodation. This is the situation in many
employment discrimination cases like in Adeyeye; however, in Adeyeye,
the problem arose after the employee made the request, and the
inquiry was whether the employee’s request was based on a religious
need and if the employer knew that it was a religious request.154 Since
the court reasoned that the request itself did not have to explicitly state
“Title VII” or “religious accommodation,” this category also warrants
an inquiry into “how much” notice constitutes adequate notice.
Scenario two: Neither the employee nor the employer knows of
the conflict. The employer will be aware of its work rules and the
applicant will know her religious beliefs, but neither side will inform
the other of these matters during the course of the job interview or
work period. Under such circumstances, no dialogue will occur
between the job applicant and the employer as to this unidentified
conflict, through no fault of either party. In that scenario, in the event
of a hire, the employer would not be liable for failure to accommodate
until the conflict actually arises.
Scenario three: An employee does not know about the conflict
between her belief and the employer’s workplace practice while an
employer might know of the conflict. This is the situation that arose in
Abercrombie, where testimony from the employee applicant shows she
was completely unaware of any conflict, whereas the employer’s
testimony highlighted its suspicions of the employee’s practice and

153

Heller v. Ebb Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Dixon v.
Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 855 (11th Cir. 2009); Brown v. Polk Cty., 61 F.3d 650,
654 (8th Cir. 1995).
154
See Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 450–51 (7th Cir. 2013).
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correctly assumed it existed based on her religious beliefs.155 In this
scenario, an employer is then in a better position to determine
whether the employee’s attire is likely to create a conflict in the
employer’s own workplace.
These three scenarios highlight that, by virtue of the applicant’s
or employee’s position, she may never acquire knowledge of the
conflict, and conversely, by virtue of the employer’s position, it may
never acquire knowledge of the conflict, in which case there cannot be
a problem. Moreover, because there are situations in which the
applicant or employee may never be aware of the conflict, the burden
should not automatically fall on the applicant or employee to initiate
the dialogue with the employer.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION
CLAIMS
“This is really easy,” Justice Scalia stated from the bench before
announcing the 8-1 opinion in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,
finding in favor of the EEOC;156 however, since that ruling, employers
and employees alike have been questioning the “simplicity” of the
opinion. Instead of clarifying the “knowledge” and “notice” standards
previously articulated by the lower courts, the Court seemed to do away
with a knowledge standard altogether and applied a new legal
approach: motive, not knowledge, is the deciding factor in a Title VII
religious accommodation claim.157
The concurrence expressed
concerns that to determine any motive, knowledge is still required, and
furthermore, under Justice Scalia’s interpretation, Title VII could be
used to hold an employer liable without fault.158 And in his dissent,
Justice Thomas criticized the majority for its Title VII interpretation
that an employer implementing a neutral workplace policy could
engage in intentional discrimination. Here, the EEOC’s claim is a
disparate impact issue; as a result, it reasoned Abercrombie’s Look
Policy was neutral, and Abercrombie did not discriminate against
Elauf.159 With three new approaches to the knowledge-and-notice
issue, the Supreme Court delivered a more complicated opinion than
155

EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1147–48 (10th Cir.
2013) (Ebel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156
Adam Liptak, Muslim Woman Denied Job over Head Scarf Wins in Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/us/supreme-courtrules-in-samantha-elauf-abercrombie-fitch-case.html.
157
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015).
158
Id. at 2035–36 (Alito, J., concurring in part).
159
Id. at 2038 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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originally thought.
A. The Majority’s Decision: Motive, Not Knowledge, is the Deciding
Factor
The Supreme Court ruled that an employer is not required to
have actual knowledge of a person’s religious practice to violate Title
VII if an employer refuses to make an accommodation for that person
(i.e., an adverse employment action) with an illegal motive related to
religious practice.160 Justice Scalia highlighted that the statutory
language of Title VII does not impose a knowledge requirement,
unlike other antidiscrimination statutes; instead, he concluded that
“the intentional discrimination provision” of Title VII “prohibits
certain motives, regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge.”161 In
other words, “[m]otive and knowledge are separate concepts.”162
Justice Scalia imagined a situation where an employer has actual
knowledge of an applicant’s need for an accommodation, but that
employer’s refusal to hire the applicant may not be motivated by any
desire to avoid an accommodation. Therefore, he argued, the
converse is true, as well: an employer who acts with motive to avoid an
accommodation may violate Title VII even where the employer has an
“unsubstantiated suspicion.”163 Such a scenario is consistent with what
occurred in Abercrombie, where the hiring manager avoided asking
questions about any accommodations despite having a “suspicion” that
Elauf wore a headscarf for religious reasons. According to Justice
Scalia: “[T]he rule for disparate-treatment claims based on a failure to
accommodate a religious practice is straightforward: An employer may
not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a
factor in employment decisions.”164 Thus, when a refusal to hire is
based on at least a “suspicion” or a “hunch” that a worker follows a
religious practice and wants to keep doing so, even if contrary to
company policy, an employer may be found liable for a Title VII
violation.165 Such a result, despite Abercrombie’s objections, takes the
burden off applicants by finding that a job applicant has no affirmative
obligation to inform her potential employer of a religious conflict.166

160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id. at 2032.
Id. at 2032–33 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2033.
Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2033.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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What the opinion does not clarify, however, is how an applicant
will demonstrate motive, given that a “hunch”—although less
immeasurable and more intuitive—still requires thought or some form
of “knowledge.” The Court reasoned it would be easier to infer motive
where an applicant does make an accommodation request or an
employer is certain that a particular religious practice exists, but such
proofs are not necessary to establish liability.167 In practice, this means
that if an applicant requests an exception to a “Look Policy” because
of her practice of wearing a hijab and an employer denies her request,
such a denial would be sufficient to establish motive; however, such
direct proof would not be necessary. Rather, if an employer “suspects”
the headscarf is a hijab worn for religious purposes but avoids any
conversation regarding accommodation, it may still have sufficient
motive. But what happens in the case where the employer does not
even suspect that the headscarf is worn for religious reasons? Can that
employer be found liable? Justice Scalia considered this concern in a
footnote:
While a knowledge requirement cannot be added to the
motive requirement, it is arguable that the motive
requirement itself is not met unless the employer at least suspects
that the practice in question is a religious practice—i.e., that he
cannot discriminate “because of” a “religious practice” unless
he knows or suspects it to be a religious practice. That issue
is not presented in this case, since Abercrombie knew—or at
least suspected—that the scarf was worn for religious reasons.
The question has therefore not been discussed by either side,
in brief or oral argument. It seems to us inappropriate to
resolve this unargued point by way of dictum, as the
concurrence would do.168
With this footnote, Justice Scalia declined to answer whether motive
can be met without a showing that the employer “at least suspects that
the practice in question is a religious practice.”169 It is undisputed that
Abercrombie at least suspected that Elauf wore the hijab for religious
reasons, as it is clear from the evidence that the hiring manager asked
her supervisor about the head covering. From Justice Scalia’s
statement, one understands that at minimum, suspicion is necessary to
establish motive for liability purposes. Such a claim, however, raises
the question: how does one measure “suspicion” without considering
what the employer “knew” at the time of hiring? Justice Alito, critical
167
168
169

Id.
Id. at 2033 n.3 (emphasis added).
Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2033 n.3.
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of the majority’s “no-knowledge” standard, addressed this point in his
concurrence.
B. The Concurrence: Knowledge is Still Relevant
It would “be very strange,” Justice Alito stated, if Title VII did not
impose a knowledge requirement.170 According to Justice Alito, under
the “no-knowledge” standard, the Court fails to answer the question of
what level of “suspicion” is necessary to find the prohibited motive in
an employer’s hiring decision. As a result, an employer is essentially
strictly liable for failing to accommodate a practice that an employer
has no idea is religious in nature.171 Therefore, Justice Alito maintains
that Title VII has a knowledge requirement and that as a result, if
Abercrombie truly had no knowledge of Elauf’s religious needs, it
could avoid liability. He proffers that an underlying purpose of the
Title VII discrimination statute is to require employers to engage in an
interactive process with applicants and employees to consider whether
their adherence to religious practices could be accommodated in light
of a workplace policy without undue hardship.172 Asserting a strict
liability standard would “deprive employers” of the opportunity to
engage in such an interactive process.173
To further clarify his knowledge standard, Justice Alito explained
that it is still unnecessary for a plaintiff to show that an employer
engaged in an adverse employment action because of the religious
nature of the practice. An employer may be liable, for instance, where
it institutes a policy to “reject[] all applicants who refuse to work on
Saturday, whether for religious or nonreligious reasons,” but
nevertheless knows that one applicant’s refusal to work on Saturday is
based on religious practices.174 In other words, even with a neutral
workplace policy, an employer must engage in the interactive
accommodation process with an applicant who cannot comply because
of religious reasons. Justice Alito based his reasoning on the existence
of the “undue hardship” defense, claiming that the very purpose of this
defense is to shield an employer from liability for refusing to make an
exception to a neutral work rule if it can prove undue hardship.175
In his final point, Justice Alito criticizes the Court’s interpretation
of the plaintiff’s burden in a reasonable accommodation claim. While
170
171
172
173
174
175

Id. at 2035 (Alito, J., concurring in part).
See id. at 2036.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2036 (Alito, J., concurring in part).
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the Court asserts that it is the “plaintiff’s burden” to prove the failureto-accommodate claim, Justice Alito argues that a plaintiff need only
prove that an employer (1) failed or refused to hire an individual (2)
because of (3) any aspect of the individual’s practice—elements which
“make no mention of accommodation.”176 An employer, therefore,
bears the burden of production and persuasion if and when it asserts
the undue hardship defense. As a result, the plaintiff need not show
that the employer was motivated or was attempting to avoid making an
accommodation, but once a plaintiff demonstrates that the employer
failed to hire because of a plaintiff’s religious practice, then the
employer must assert and prove the undue hardship defense.177 Such
a clarification of the parties’ burdens, Justice Alito believes, may make
a difference in close cases.178
C. The Dissent: Against the “Disparate-Treatment-Based-on-EqualTreatment Claim”
In his dissent, Justice Thomas found that the majority’s
interpretation created “an entirely new form of liability: the disparatetreatment-based-on-equal-treatment claim.”179
He upheld the
“undisputed proposition” that application of a neutral policy could not
constitute “intentional discrimination;” as a result, because
Abercrombie’s Look Policy was neutral, Abercrombie did not
discriminate against Elauf.180 Furthermore, Justice Thomas argued
that the majority’s interpretation of Title VII was too broad, specifically
criticizing the interpretation of the phrase, “because of such
individual’s religious practice.”181 He argued that the majority’s
“because of” reading includes scenarios in which an employer has a
neutral workplace policy and an employee’s practice “happens” to be
religious.182 This reading would “punish employers who have no
discriminatory motive” in instituting the practice, and such a “strict
liability” reading, he argued, is “at odds with intentional
discrimination.”183

176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2041 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2037.
See Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2038–39 (Alito, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 2039.
Id. at 2038–39.
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V. THE AFTERMATH OF ABERCROMBIE
After the opinion was handed down, the parties quickly settled.
Abercrombie paid $25,670 in damages to Elauf and $18,983 in court
costs.184 While Elauf received only a small settlement, the Abercrombie
ruling resulted in a great expansion of workplace religious
accommodation. By eliminating “religious accommodation” as a
freestanding claim and relaxing the “because of” standard, the Court
afforded employees and applicants an easier way to prove motive in
hiring decisions.
A. Religious Discrimination or Accommodation?: How Eliminating the
Distinction Influenced the Majority’s Decision
It is possible that the knowledge and notice discussion could have
been avoided altogether if the parties and courts had taken another
approach from the outset. Professor Charles Sullivan considers: “The
apparent circuit split on what is necessary to trigger the duty to
accommodate needs to be resolved, but one good start would be to
stop viewing all religious discrimination cases through an
accommodation lens.”185 He posits that the Tenth Circuit’s Abercrombie
decision might have had a different outcome if litigated as a
straightforward case of discrimination against Muslims. Suppose Elauf
would have been willing to forgo wearing a hair covering. The store
would then have turned her down because of her religion when, in fact,
her religion was no obstacle to employment. This result then becomes
a per se discrimination claim. Even so, an employer could still claim
another defense, such as the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ), arguing that it is allowed to consider certain attributions
when making hiring decisions because they are necessary to the
profession.186 Professor Sullivan suggests: “In that case, the focus would
be how critical the Look Policy was to Abercrombie and whether some
exceptions might co-exist with it. Not that such an inquiry might not
have its own complications: hijab yes, burka, no?”187
Professor Sullivan’s assessment foreshadows an interesting series
of events: in a similar line of thinking, the EEOC switched its theory
from religious accommodation to an intentional discrimination claim

184

Press Release, EEOC, Abercrombie Resolves Religious Discrimination Case
Following Supreme Court Ruling in Favor of EEOC (July 28, 2015),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/7-28-15.cfm.
185
Sullivan, supra note 100.
186
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2014).
187
Sullivan, supra note 100.

WEISS (DO NOT DELETE)

1146

5/18/2016 1:03 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1113

right before oral argument at the Supreme Court.188 And the Court
agreed. In an unexpected analysis, the Court corrected lower courts’
and the EEOC’s previous assumptions that religious accommodation
was a freestanding claim. Going forward, lower courts should refrain
from analyzing reasonable accommodation claims in a vacuum. The
Court’s clarification of the law most likely had the biggest impact on
the Abercrombie decision. Analyzing the EEOC’s accommodation claim
in Abercrombie as a straightforward disparate treatment claim warranted
a direct analysis of the “because of” standard in the Title VII.
In its ruling, the Court relaxed the “because of” statutory language
of Title VII disparate treatment claims. Title VII provides that it is
unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire “because of” a religious
practice. To show that the employer took an adverse employment
action, the applicant need only show that her religious practice was a
“motivating factor” in the action. It is irrelevant whether the employer
knew that there would be a conflict between the employee’s religious
beliefs and a job duty. It is also irrelevant whether the employer knew
about the employee’s religious beliefs. What matters in a Title VII is
what motivated the employer’s decision.
B. Applying the Suspicion Standard Below
In light of Abercrombie’s lowered “because of” standard, the Fifth
Circuit considered Nobach on a second appeal.189 As previously stated,
Nobach involved a nursing home activities aide who was fired after she
refused to pray the rosary with a patient because it conflicted with her
religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness.190 Using the Supreme Court’s
analysis, the court still ruled in favor of the nursing home as a matter
of law, but this time on per se discrimination grounds. Although the
nursing home admitted that Nobach’s refusal to pray the Rosary was a
factor in her discharge, the court found no evidence that anyone
involved in the termination suspected Nobach’s refusal was “because
of” her religious practice.191 When the nursing home director fired
Nobach, she told Nobach: “I don’t care if it’s your fifth write-up or not.
I would have fired you for this instance alone.”192 Nobach—for the first
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vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2803 (2015).
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time—then informed the director that performing the Rosary was
against her religion, stating: “Well, I can’t pray the Rosary. It’s against
my religion.”193 The director’s response was: “I don’t care if it is against
your religion or not. If you don’t do it, it’s insubordination.”194 Had
this conversation taken place before her discharge, Nobach may have been
able to argue that Woodland had a “certainty that the practice
exist[ed]” and therefore it would have been “easier to infer motive.”195
Even though Nobach framed the claim as intentional discrimination,
Nobach was unable to proffer evidence that the director fired her as a
direct result of her religious beliefs.
What is disconcerting about the Fifth Circuit’s outcome, however,
is that the nursing home admits that Nobach’s refusal to pray the
Rosary was a factor in its firing decision. It is hard to believe that
during the firing process, the employer did not question Nobach’s
refusal to pray the Rosary, given that such a request involves a highly
religious practice. Although a conversation took place after the fact,
such a scenario highlights the importance of communication among
employees and employers. While Woodland may have escaped
liability, it did so merely based on the timeline of its decision.
Although “insubordination” is a valid reason for any termination,
situations like that in Nobach deserve further consideration by
employers who may make rash decisions without any dialogue.
VI. THAT’S A WRAP!: WHAT THIS DECISION MEANS FOR EMPLOYERS
GOING FORWARD
Communication is key in any employment context. Not only is it
important, but it is now also necessary for both sides to establish a
rapport and open lines of communication, beginning with the
interview process. It is fair to ask employers to institute a formal
process through which they can disclose workplace policy conflicts that
could interfere with an employee’s or applicant’s religious practices.
And given the new ruling that prohibits employers from making an
applicant’s religious practice a factor in an employment decision, it is
highly recommended that employers move quickly to establish new
policies if they are not already in place.
There are many practical ways that employers can institute
procedures to better inform their future and current employees of a
position’s essential requirements and ask if any accommodations are
193
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necessary. For instance, in this technological age where many job
applications are submitted online, an employer can include a manual
of its workplace policies with its application. It could add a statement
on its application about being an equal opportunity employer and a
clause regarding reasonable accommodation.
It could read:
“Employees who believe that they are entitled to a reasonable
accommodation of our workplace policies due to religious beliefs,
practices, or other grounds protected by relevant law should discuss
the matter with their supervisor or hiring manager.
Such
accommodations will be granted unless they pose an undue burden on
the employer.” And during the interview process, an employer could
arguably make a statement such as: “It is our obligation as an employer
to implement equal employment opportunities and refrain from
discrimination based on race, religion, or gender. These are our
policies (insert dress/grooming or scheduling policies). Would you
need an accommodation for said policies?” This dialogue would
provide an applicant or employee the opportunity to vocalize an
accommodation request if needed in a way that still respects privacy.
Furthermore, employers still maintain the undue hardship
defense if they can show that an applicant or employee’s request would
pose more than a de minimis burden.196 Specifically, if an employee
can meet the expectations for hire, perform a job function, and the
employer can reasonably accommodate that employee, then every
reasonable measure should be taken to allow the employee to work.
Ultimately, an employee should not have to choose between work and
religion.
At the very least, employers should document hiring decisions
and mark down their commonsense observations of an applicant as
evidence of an attempt to start an interactive dialogue. As previously
explained, given that motive is the deciding factor in religious
discrimination claims, the majority’s approach creates a murky
“suspicion” standard—one in which an employer is liable for having a
hunch of a potential conflict, but failing to mention any such conflict.
Documenting an employer’s internal evaluation process—specifically
all factors unrelated to any protected traits—would better safeguard
the employer and its hiring decisions.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Religious discrimination claims are on the rise, and sensitive
interests are at stake—particularly the employee’s right to religious
freedom and the employer’s interests in economic liberty. Employees
want to feel protected and able to practice their religious beliefs.
Employers, on the other hand, want to run their businesses efficiently
and with autonomy. As religious discrimination law continues to play
a part in the American workplace, employers and employees must
understand their rights. Like other statutes that govern the workplace,
religious accommodation claims require employer attention and
compliance. Title VII expressly prohibits religious discrimination by
protecting those workers who hold—or who refuse to hold—specific
religious beliefs, thereby ensuring fair employment. Yet, an employer
might find it difficult to comply with the law, as there is not yet a clear
framework for proving the “motive” requirement without
demonstrating “knowledge.”
Thus, it is essential for employers to adopt policies that comply
with the approach in Abercrombie. But if faced with a future lawsuit, it
is reasonable for employers to make the argument, based on Justice
Alito’s concurrence, that knowledge is still required to show motive,
and any lack of knowledge shields employers from liability.

